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NOTE
Unauthorized Embryo Transfer at the
University of California, Irvine Center For
Reproductive Health
By SUPR YA KAKK*
"The embryos they stole, they were my children!"'
L Introduction
Deborah and John Challender had been trying to conceive a child for
ten years?2 Almost hopeless, they came to the Center for Reproductive
Health at the University of California, Irvine,4 looking for a miracle. In
1992, Deborah gave birth to a son as a result of CR-'s services." Three
years later, they discovered that their doctor had also implanted some of
Deborah's eggs into a woman in another county-who had given birth to
twins7 Neither Deborah nor the woman knew of the transfer until the dis-
covery years later!
Others, not as fortunate as Deborah, were unable to conceive with
CRHs help. Diane Porter also came to CRH hoping to conceive.9 She was
* J.D., 1997, Hastings College of the Law. I wish to thank Professor Radhika Rao for her
guidance and help.
1. Statement by John Challender, one of the victims of the scandal at the fertility clinic.
Michelle Nicolosi, Fertility: Family Speaks Out, ORANGE COUNTYREG. June 8, 1995, at 3.
2. See Kathryn Wexler, Egg-Swapping Scandal Still Unfolding: Infertility Clinic's Prac-
tices PutDoctors, University UnderScrutiny, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1995, atAl.
3. Hereinafter referred to as "CRH"
4. Hereinafter referred to as "UCL"
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not so lucky-after spending $40,000, she went home childless to Ne-
braska.10 Four years later, she learned that she was an unsuspecting donor
of four eggs to an equally unsuspecting recipient." Similarly, Loretta and
Basilio Jorge spent over $30,000 for fertility treatment with no results.
12
Without her consent, Loretta's eggs were given to another couple who sub-
sequently gave birth to twins. 3 Yet another patient donated her eggs for
research at CRH, with the understanding that they would be used to spe-
cifically benefit her own fertility, 14 only to later discover that her eggs had
been sent to a Wisconsin zoologist.
5
These are only a sampling of the horrifying stories that have emerged
from the unfolding investigation at CRE16 UCI doctors allegedly shipped
embryos for research without consent, transferred embryos to unknowing
recipients, and destroyed or hid information relating to ownership of frozen
embryos.
17
Since the scandal first broke in May 1995, experts estimate that more
than sixty women have been unwillingly involved in improper egg trans-
fers.' 8 Ten of those women subsequently gave birth and the genetic parents
are still unknown.19 Now there are unwilling genetic parents and unknow-
ing gestational mothers.
The scandal at UCI encompasses scenarios which challenge legal vo-
cabulary. Several charges were brought against the doctors allegedly re-
sponsible, including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and breach
of contract.20 In addition, one of the doctors faced federal mail fraud and
income tax charges.21 The alleged criminal conduct of the doctors at CRH
;10. See id
11. See id.
,12. See Diane Seo, Ex-UCI Patient Seeks to Meet Twins Born to Someone Else, LA. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1996, atB1.
'13. See ia
14. See A Hearing to Investigate UC Irvine's Fertility Clinic Before Senate Select Comm.
on Higher Education, June 14, 1995.
I5. See i,
16. See id.
17. See Julie Marquis, UCFertility Case Doctor Sells Home, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at
A3.
18. See Susan Kelleher et a]., Fertility Clinic Investigation; UCI Scandal Doubles, ORANGE
COUNTYREG., Nov. 4, 1995, at 1.
19. See Suit Filed for Custody of Twins in UC Fertility Clinic Scandal, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 3, 1996, at B5.
20. See Shirley J. Paine et al., Ethical Dilemmas in Reproductive Medicine, 18 WInTrE L.
REV. 51, 66 (1997).
21. See Kim Christensen and Jim Muluaney, Doctor Disputes Accusations in Fertility Clinic
Scandal, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 3, 1996, at BI. One doctor fled the United States to
Mexico and the other to Chile where, interestingly enough, both have resumed their medical prao-
tices. See Settlements OK'd in UCI Fertility Suits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRB., Aug. 16, 1997, at
A6.
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lies in settled areas of the law. But the law is uncertain on the issue of
custody in light of the reproductive technology. How will the law decide
ownership with respect to the result of this reproductive technology when
the intent to parent is equal on both sides? How will the law decide whose
right of privacy takes precedence when an outside third party created the
situation?22
The judicial system is ill-equipped to resolve ethical questions result-
ing from breakthrough advances in -reproductive technology.23 Courts have
utilized a variety of approaches in adjudicating reproductive technology is-
sues.24 The right to procreate is encompassed within the right of privacy, a
constitutional guarantee that courts have used in resolving surrogacy and
embryo disposition conflicts.25 Contract law gives preference to the party
who intended to parent.26 Property law focuses upon the embryo as tangi-
ble material whose owner has the sole right to determine its disposition. 7
Family law focuses upon the definition of parenthood and best interest of
the child, looking at gestational, genetic, and social ties? Courts lave tra-
ditionally used combinations of these substantive areas of law when re-
solving reproductive technology disputes.29 However, when desperate cou-
ples flocked to the CRH looking for a chance to conceive, 30 never
envisioning these horrific outcomes, they subject themselves to the risks of
the new and largely untested fertility industry3 ' The ethical and legal
22. Since May 1995, over 100 couples have filed suit against UCI and the doctors. As of
September 1997, 80 of those claims have been settled for a total of $14 million. See Mary
Micheletti, Stolen Dreams, CAL. L. Bus., Sept. 2, 1997, at 28. The legal issues presented, how-
ever, have yet to be resolved by any court.
23. See BARRY FURROW & SANDRA JOHNSON, BiOETCS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICs
113 (2d ed. 1991).
24. See Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. Rsv. 1473, 1490 (1995)
(identifying and analyzing constitutional, contractual and property approaches to resolving di-
lemmas posed by new reproductive technologies).
25. See id. at 1496; see also discussion infra Part IRA.
26. See Rao, supra note 24, at 1496. See also discussion infra Part II.B.
27. See Rao, supra note 24, at 1496. See also discussion infra Part 1H.C.
28. See Rao, supra note 24, at 1496. See also discussion infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part IlM
30. See Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a Public Health Problem: Why Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technologies Are Not the Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 89 (1995), for an interesting
discussion of infertility as a public health problem which in vitro fertilization technology is not
addressing.
31. See Mihelle Nicolosi, Fertility Industry Outruns Ethics, ORANGE COUNTY REG., 1995,
at 9. Legislative response has been forthcoming. California State Senator Tom Hayden intro-
duced a bill, later passed by both state houses, making it a felony to implant or transfer embryonic
material without the written consent of the donor or recipient. Section 367 subsection g of the
California Penal Code provides that-
(a) It shall be unlawful for anyone to knowingly use sperm, ova, or embryos in assisted
reproduction technology, for any purpose other than that indicated by the sperm, ova, or
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questions remain unsolved in an environment where the affected parties'
have invested great emotions and where the medical field is laregely un-
regulated. 32
Among the many issues left unresolved, one is the compensation, if
any, which the genetic donors should receive for genetic material used for
research purposes.3 3 Another is the disposition of frozen embryos of un-
known origin? 4 The third unresolved issue, and the subject of this Note, is
the proper resolution of custody and visitation rights where unauthorized
embryo transfer results in live birth. Who raises the child: unknowing do-
nors like Deborah or Loretta George, or the equally unknowing recipient
who gave birth to the child?
Property law, contract law and constitutional law provide inadequate
guidance for resolving this question of custody.35 The best interests of the
child standard, borrowed from family law principles, supplies the best an-
swer.36 This standard, coupled with a presumption in favor of the gesta-
tional mother, will promote stability in the child's life, accord with soci-
ety's value of existing family relationships, and foster certainty in a largely
unregulated field.
3 7
I1. The Process of in Vitro Fertilization
To understand the impact created by the CRH scandal, it is important
to understand the technology used. CRH used in vitro fertilization (herein-
after referred to as '"VF") which is a medical process whereby infertile
coup!es can conceive their own child3 8 First, a couple is carefully screened
embryo provider's signature on a written consent form. (b) It shall be unlawful for
anyone to knowingly implant sperm, ova, or embryos, through the use of assisted repro-
duction technology, into a recipient who is not the sperm, ova, or embryo provider,
without the signed consent of the sperm, ova, or embryo provider and recipient (c)
Any person who violates this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for three, four, or five years, by a fine not to exceed fifty thousand dollars
($50,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(g) (West
Supp., 1993).
32. See Bill Davidoff, Frozen Embryos:. A Need for Thawing in the Legislative Process, 47
SMU L. REV. 131, 133 (1993).
33. See Joel N. Ephross, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current Issues, 32
JURIMETCS .447,461-62 (1992) (discussing liability and damages for unauthorized research).
34. SeeId. at467-70.
35. See discussion infra Parts IIIA.-C.
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
37. See discussion infra Part IV.B. A task force convened in July 1995 recently submitted
redommendations to the Board of Regents for ensuring against similar misappropriations in the
fufure. See Pamela Burdman, UCFertility Clinics to Bolster Rules, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 1996,
at All. The recommendations include closer monitoring of clinic operations, standardizing con-
sent procedure to include a two-level documenting system, and mandatory annual reports from
clinic directors to the corresponding medical school. See id
38. See Davidoff, supra note 32, at 131.
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to determine if they have the type of infertility problem that IVF is de-
signed to solve.39 If so, an ovum is fertilized outside of the woman's body
and subsequently implanted in her uterus.40 Thereafter, the woman re-
ceives fertility drugs which control her ovulation to stimulate eggs.41 The
eggs are then removed either by laparoscopy or ultrasound transvaginal as-
piration. 2 One method, laparoscopy, involves making small incisions into
the abdomen and extracting the eggs using a laparoscope and hollow nee-
dle4 3 The second method, ultrasound transvaginal aspiration, a newer and
less painful technique, involves inserting a suctioning needle, with an ultra-
sound viewing device, into the abdomen or vagina, and extracting the egg
through the suctioning needle.!4 After removal, the eggs are fertilized with
sperm.45 A pre-embryo forms and begins to divide4 6 During the four or
eight-cell-division stage, the physician uses a thin catheter to transfer the
embryo to the uterus, ideally effecting implantation.4! 7 The unused eggs are
frozen for later use.!8
An essential aid to this IVF'procedure is cyropreservation, which al-
lows embryos to be frozen anytime during the two to eight-cell-division
stage.4 9 This technique allows doctors to delay embryo implantation until
the debilitating effects of hormone stimulation have ceased.50 In addition,
having frozen embryos allows patients to undergo the expense and pain of
laparoscopic or ultrasound transvaginal aspiration only once while being
able to implant as many times as there are embryos available until success
is achieved. This creates efficiency because the risk of failure in the IVF
procedure is high.
5 2
39. Selection criteria include age, medical history, and health. See Id. at 134. IVF is useful
in cases where infertility is due to male dysfimctions, tubal factors, mucas abnormalities, and im-
munity to spermatozoa. See kl
40. See Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes? 26 CONN. L. REv.
305,307(1993).
41. See id.
42. See Perry Clifton & L. Kristen Schneider, Cyropreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide
Their Fate?, 13 . LEGALMED. 463, 467 (1992).
43. See id.
44. See Feliciano, supra note 40, at 307.




49. See id. The embryos are stored in liquid nitrogen at 195 degrees below zero centigrade,
which suspends germ cell division. See id. The fertilized ova can be stored for up to two years.
safely; however, the fill effects of long-term cyropreservation are not yet known. See id
50. See id.
51. See id
52. See id. at 469. For example, eggs may not develop, fertilization may not occur, or im-
plantation may fail. See id.
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The IVF procedure itself is a difficult experience for participants.53
Every aspiration and implantation procedure costs about $10,000, and usu-
ally more than one procedure is required for successful implantation.
5 4
Further, "[tlhe IVF experience is.physically taxing for the prospective
mother and emotionally draining for both prospective parents. Clinics re-
port that couples attempting IVF often show an abnormal attachment to the
embryos, sometimes even naming them, and experience deep depression if
successful implantation does not occur."55 Participants' emotions are at
their peaks during the process of the IVF regarding procedure.
Disputes regarding disposition of embryos are thus especially painful
due to the emotional nature of the IVF procedure, which is further magni-
fied by the alleged criminal acts of the doctors at CRH.
There were allegations that the doctors at CRH implanted genetic ma-
terial from one couple into another woman without either party's consent or
knowledge.56 In at least two cases, the recipients of the unauthorized trans-
fers subsequently gave birth, with the identity of the genetic parents dis-
covered after the fact.57 Although the clinic utilized record-keeping proce-
dures, evidence shows that the doctors were deliberately sloppy.5 8 In one
case, for example, fourteen eggs were extracted from a patient.5 9 Four were
used in the GIFT procedure.60 Of the remaining ten, three were earmarked
for another woman scheduled to undergo the JVF procedure.61 Allegedly,
the doctor told the first patient that only seven eggs had been extracted, and
four of those had been placed in her Fallopian tubes.6 2 By the end of the
day, however, all of the remaining eggs had been fertilized 63 and the medi-
cal chart recording the transfers is now missing.64 As can be expected the
intensity of emotions are carried into the legal arena where the current
53. See Davidoff, supra note 32, at 136-37.
54. See Feliciano, supra note 40, at 308.
55. Id. at 308-09, (citing Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the
Clinical Setting, 18 HAsTINGS C04E REP. 26, 27 (1988)).
56. Doctors at CRH invented and utilized the gamete intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT) proce-
dure in which an egg is extracted normally, but semen and the egg are then placed together in the
fallopian tubes, where fertilization takes place. See FURROW & JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 120.
57. See Tracy Weber & Julie Marquis, In Quest for Miracles, Did Fertility Clinic Go Too
Far?, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1995, at Al.
58. See Susan Kelleher & Kim Christensen, O.C. Woman's Eggs Were Fertilized andPut in
Another Patient at UCI Clinic, Documents Indicate, ORANGE COUNTYREG., May 19, 1995, at 1.
59. See id
60. See id. GIFT was invented by two of the doctors involved in the scandal. Tracy Weber,
Inquiries Target Fertility Clinic at UCIrvine, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1995, at Al.





frameworks under constitutional law, contract law and property law are in-
adequate in resolving these disputes.
m. Inadequacy of Constitutional Law, Contract Law and
Property Law Approaches in Reproductive Technology
A. Constitutional Law
1. Right ofPrivacy
The right of privacy, stemming from substantive liberty interests of the
14th Amendment is the foundation in resolving reproductive disputes under
the Constitution. This right originated in Griswold v. Connecticut,65 where
the Supreme Court upheld the privacy right of married couples to use con-
traception without state interference, noting that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaran-
tees that help give them life and substance. '66 Justice Douglas found the
marital relationship to lie within a zone of privacy created by these consti-
tutional guarantees.6 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,68 the Court extended the use
of contraceptives to unmarried persons. Justice Brennan emphasized that
"[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual.., to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 9
The court subsequently applied the right of privacy espoused in Gris-
wold and Eisenstadt to a woman's right under the Due Process Clause to
terminate pregnancy without state influence in Roe v. Wade.70 In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey7' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional
protection of the decision to procreate, stating that "[those decisions to use
contraception] support the reasoning in Roe relating to the woman's liberty
because they involve personal decisions concerning not only the meaning
of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it.,
72
Such statements by the Supreme Court arguably demonstrate that there
is a certain constitutional right to privacy which recognizes a private sphere
into which the state may not enter. These pronouncements also indicate
65. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66. Id at484.
67. See id. at 485.
68. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
69. Id. at 453.
70. 410 U.S. 113,165 (1973).
71. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72. See id at 852-53.
i s
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that this right of privacy ensures against the state's interference with an in-
fertile couple's desire to conceive their own biological children.
2. The right to privacy is not equal to the right to raise a child
The right to privacy, however, is inadequate in resolving the difficult
issues posed by reproductive technology.73 The concept of parenthood has
changed in such a way that the right to procreate, as limited as it may be
today, does not provide a comprehensive approach to answering the ques-
tion of which type of bond creates the superior right to raise a child: ge-
ijetic, gestational or social.74
Since Roe, the Court has chipped away at state assistance of an indi-
vidual's right to make reproductive choices.75 Even a restrictive reading of
Roe itself would make the right of privacy developed therein inapplicable
tb an embryo outside of a woman's body as opposed to a fetus inside her
body.76 In other words, "if a significantly developed fetus is not afforded
l~gal protection, it is inconsistent to extend such protection to an eight-cell
entity., 77 Moreover, the right to privacy encompasses an individual's deci-
sIion to procreate, but does not solve the difficult dilemma of choosing be-
tween gestational or genetic parents. Even if the right to reproduce was ac-
companied by the right to raise one's biological child, "how do we
determine which procreator-the gamete contributors, the gestator, or the
intending parents-possesses these related rights?" 78
The biological parents of a child conceived through unauthorized em-
bryo transfer could not assert a privacy right to the child analogous to that
of a woman asserting a privacy right to the fetus in her body.79 "The very
agreement that enhances the infertile couple's constitutional right to pri-
vacy of procreation may impair the surrogate mother's constitutional rights
73. The right of privacy is too weak to assert child-rearing rights, but it has been used to
support the right of parents to the IVF procedure itself. See JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCIE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); see also Kristine E.
Luongo, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Potential Life, " 29 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1011, 1026 (arguing that the recognition ofprivacy rights in marriage and procreation would
also extend to any type of procreation, including IVF).
74. See generally Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation
Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1581, 1624-29 (1994) (arguing
that the decision to use IVF relates to the personal decision to bear genetically related children,
therefore couples have right of access to IVF).
75. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (holding that there is no unqualified con-
stitutional right to an abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,327 (1980).
76. See Luongo, supra note 73, at 1038; see also Rao, supra note 24, at 1484-85.
77. Feliciano, supra note 40, at 345.
78. Rao, supra note 24, at 1487.
79. See id at 1494.
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to privacy of person .... so However, to the extent that such a privacy
right would waive contractual obligations, it further demonstrates its inde-
terminacy.81
The right of privacy simply does not answer the question: Which set
of parents possesses the superior right to raise a child, genetic or gesta-
tional? According to the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert,8
2
for example, the right to procreation does not include a right to raise a child
which is superior to the rights of other parties involved. 3 In Johnson, the
court refused to entertain the gestational surrogate mother's privacy interest
in the child, stating: "the choice to gestate and deliver a baby to its genetic
parents... is [not] the equivalent, in constitutional weight of the decision
whether to bear a child of one's own."8'
Additionally, the final decision about who has the right to raise the
child at issue is not private in nature. It will affect at least two families
fighting for custody, as well as affect the actions of future parties contem-
plating IVF as a solution to infertility. In Davis v. Davis,85 the Tennessee
Supreme Court, finding that the right to avoid genetic parenthood is en-
compassed within the individual right to privacy, asserted: '"the existence of
the right [to procreational autonomy] itself dictates that decisional authority
rests in the gamete-providers alone, at least to the extent that their deci-
sions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status. 86 Re-
solving the custody dispute of a child conceived because of illegal embryo
transfer thus cannot rest upon the right of privacy because more than one
party is impacted.
In sum, the right of privacy affords a limited right to procreate free
from state interference, but is too narrow to resolve the competing parent-
hood interests presented by the new reproductive technology.
B. Contract Law
1. Intent
Contract law also provides an approach to adjudicating disputes which
stem from new reproductive technology. The intent to procreate is the key
element that courts use to resolve custody or surrogacy disputes.87 Fur-
80. d
81. See discussion supra Part M.A.
82. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
83. See Id. at 786.
84. Id. at 787.
85. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
86. Id at 602 (emphasis added).
87. See Anne Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum
ofLegal Maternity, 80 IOWAL. REV. 265,279 (1995).
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thermore, contract law encourages observance of prior disposition agree-
ments as manifestations of that intent to procreate!8
Indeed, clinics offering IVF services often make agreements with their
patients regarding consent and disposition of the frozen embryos.8 9 Such
embryo disposition agreements are similar to those that provide for dispo-
sition of frozen embryos in the event of certain enumerated contingencies
and should be enforced as any other contract.90 Adherence to disposition
agreements "present[s] the best way to maximize the couple's reproductive
freedom,... give advance certainty to couples and IVF programs, and
... minimize disputes and their costs."91 It also respects the parties' intent
to procreate.
. By fragmenting the procreative process and allowing the assignment
of roles to particular parties, gamete donation affords individuals an un-
precedented degree of choice and control in procreation, 92 especially where
gametes have been donated by third parties.93 Thus, the intent reflected in
disposition agreements should be respected as a critical, inherent part of the
procreative process.
Courts have used intent as the critical element in resolving custody
disputes despite prior agreements. In Johnson, the California Supreme
Court granted genetic parents custody of a child, born of a surrogate, based
upon their intent to be parents.94 According to the Court, the genetic par-
ents "affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took the steps neces-
sary to effect in vitro fertilization. But for their acted-on intention, the
child would not exist."95 The Court followed this intent-based approach by
finding the prior agreement valid.96
2. Inadequacy ofIntent
The "intent to procreate" approach satisfactorily resolves custody dis-
putes between contracting parties, but it is not applicable to custody dis-
putes of children conceived through unauthorized embryo transfer. The
88. See Davidoff, supra note 32, at 151-52.
89. See Ephross, supra note 33, at 469-70.
90. See Davidoff, supra note 32, at 148-49.
91. John Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition ofFrozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. LJ.
407,414 (1990).
92. See Schiff, supra note 87, at 279.
93. See id.
94. See 851 P.2d at 787.
95. Id. at 782.
96. See id. at 785. The Court stated, "Certainly in the present case it cannot seriously be
argued that Anna, a licensed vocational nurse who had done well in school and who had previ-
ously borne a child, lacked the intellectual wherewithal or life experience necessary to make an
informed decision to enter into the surrogacy contract." Id.
1024
intent to procreate presumes voluntary and informed consent and provision
for all possible contingencies.9 7 Further, even if such an intentional, bar-
gained-for contract exists, courts do not always compel specific perform-
ance. 8 The "unsuitability" of doing so "is even more clear when the con-
cept of specific performance is used to determine the course of the life of a
child."99
In general, prior disposition agreements do not demonstrate compre-
hensive resolution of all possible scenarios. Death, divorce, risk of loss
through human error, and disagreement are the most common contingencies
enumerated on a consent form. °00 Conceivably, a consent form could like-
wise dictate resolution of cases where egg misuse occurs. However, the
provider of medical service, i.e., the fertility clinic, under these circum-
stances, would have excessive authority over issues of parenthood. 0 1
Thus, the "intent to procreate" approach is not applicable to cases like the
CRH scandal where live birth resulted from unauthorized embryo trans-
fers.
102
Neither of the parties involved in the CRH scandal intended this type
of birth. For example, Loretta Jorge did not intend for her embryo to be
implanted into another woman; the recipient of Loretta Jorge's embryo did
not intend to give birth to a child who was not genetically related to her. If
there are no intentions to procreate like that, then the intent-based approach
of contract law simply cannot apply.
C. Property Law
1. Labor, Investment and Ownership
If gamete material is the embryo and considered property, then prop-
erty rights can apply to resolve the disputes. Property law grants rights on
the basis of labor, investment, and ownership. 103 "The rights to control,
97. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 796 (Kennard, ., dissenting).
98. See id.
99. Id. '"heir delivery cannot be ordered as a contract remedy on the same terms that a
court would, for example, order a breaching party to deliver a truckload of nuts and bolts." Id at
797.
100. See Davidoff, supra note 32, at 160-64.
101. For a thorough discussion of the problems with disposition agreements generally, see
Feliciano, supra note 40, at 342-45.
102. Evidence shows that consent forms at CRH were tampered with to demonstrate consent
to donation. See Michelle Nicolosi, Fertility: Family Speaks Out, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June
8, 1995, at 21. "A color photocopy of a consent form signed by the Challenders in black ink
shows an 'X' in a box next to the donation option---in blue ink. Both [Mr. and Mrs. Challender]
vouched for their signatures, but denied checking the box approving donation." Id.
103. See Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6
STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 73,75 (1995).
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possess, use, exclude, profit and dispose, which are the major components
of the bundle of rights attaching to property, are also terms commonly used
when considering dispositional issues in human reproductive rights."""
In the past, courts have been hesitant to grant unlimited property rights
in gamete material or body tissue. In York v. Jones,10 5 a fertility clinic in
Virginia refused to transfer the Yorks' frozen embryo to a hospital in Cali-
fornia for implantation' 0 6 The district court held that the Yorks had a
property interest in the frozen embryo, citing language in the Cyropreser-
vation Agreement and a report of the American Fertility Society.'0 7
One year later, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California,'8
the California Supreme Court refused to grant a property interest in human
cells. 0 9 While undergoing treatment for hairy-cell leukemia, doctors had
removed Moore's spleen cells for research purposes without his consent."
0
Moore sued his doctors for conversion after researchers patented a billion
dollar cell-line from his spleen cells."' The court refused to find a "prop-
erty interest" for purposes of a conversion claim, because they feared,
among other things, that such a claim would obstruct medical research and
development."
2
Similarly, treatment of gametes as property was rejected by the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis."3 Instead, the court there relied
upon the standards set forth by the American Fertility Society in conclud-
ing that "pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'prop-
erty,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect
because of their potential for human life.""
4
Interestingly enough, in Hecht v. Superior Court, 5 the California
Court of Appeal relied upon Davis in recognizing property interest in
sperm." 6 The court reasoned that sperm is analogous to embryos and
therefore is unlike any other human tissue because it can be used for repro-
.104. Id.
105. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
106. See id. at 424.
107. See id The report states that "[i]t is understood that the gametes and concepti are the
property of the donors. The donors therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the
disposition of these items?' The American Fertility Society's Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTilITY AND STERILITY 89 (1986).
108. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
109. See id at 492.
110. See id at 481.
111. See id. at482.
112. See id. at 493.
113. 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992).
114. Id at 597.




ductive purposes.1 17 Therefore, decedent had decision-making authority to
bequeath sperm due to his interest in the nature of ownership."
8
Extending the laws of personal property to reproductive technology
would lend stability to the public policy quagmire in the fertility indus-
try. 19 Although "the same bundle of rights does not attach to all forms of
property,' 120 limited property rights could be recognized in embryos.12 1
2. Inapplicability of labor, investment, and ownership principles
Property law, like contract law, is inadequate in resolving custody dis-
putes stemming from egg misuse because of the complex relationship
among the parties and the complicated ownership issues of an embryo and
a child. Proprietary rights in reproduction focus upon who owns, and
therefore controls, disposition.'2 Application of property principles would
set definite limits on the decision-making rights of parents, involved third
parties, and the role of reproductive technology. 23
However, the fact remains that ownership of an embryo does not con-
fer ownership of the result, the child. Neither the gestational nor the ge-
netic parents could claim the child on the basis of a property interest. "Our
most fundamental notions of personhood tell us it is inappropriate to treat
children as property.... [T]he originator of the concept of a child can have
no such rights, because children cannot be owned as property.' 24
Similarly, the principle of invested labor helps neither genetic nor
gestational parents. Both sets of parents have invested resources in the ]VF
procedure. The procedure itself is painful, expensive, and emotionally
draining, to say nothing of the pregnancy.
In addition, labeling an embryo as property devalues its significance
and runs counter to prevailing notions of morality. "Although the notion
of treating the embryo as property may have a basis in scientific fact, the
theory ignores the tremendous importance society places on life, and more
specifically on embryos as the symbol of life."' Thus property law re-
117. See id
118. See id.
119. See Brown, supra note 103, at 177.
120. Moore, 793 P.2d at 509 (Mosk, ., dissenting).
121. Even though the Davis court rejected the view of an embryo as property, it described the
"interim" category in property-based terminology. See Brown, supra note 103, at 76-77.
122. See Janet Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations, 7 YALE
L. J. & FEMINISM 37 (1995).
123. See Brown, supra note 103, at 77-80.
124. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 796 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
125. Kim Schaefer, In-Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, and the Right to Privacy--Are
Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?, 22 PAC. L.J. 87, 96 (1990). Defining an embryo as
property creates additional problems related to disposition (specific discussion of which is beyond
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sdlves disputes of this intimate nature on a one-dimensional, academic
level without resolving them on a practical level.
IV. Family Law
A. Parenthood & Best Interests of the Child
Family law by presenting a multi-layered approach to legal issues in-
volving intimate relationships, provides the best legal framework 26 On
one level, family law deals with divorce, child custody, adoption, and post-
dissolution allocations such as child support and alimony. 127 On a second,
more theoretical level, it involves constitutional analysis of laws restricting
marriage or divorce.128 On a third level, family law "examin[es] what con-
stitutes a family, an issue that implicates sociology, politics, religion, eco-
nomics." 129 It is on this third level that family law provides the best ap-
proach in redefining parenthood and family within the context of repro-
ductive technology.
Family law looks beyond the narrow focus of ownership, intent and
privacy to the larger view of the family as a fluid structure, subject to
changing ideology due to developments in science. Theoretically, the no-
tion of having more than one mother might seem ideal. However, the
structure of our society precludes such a concept because taxes, govern-
ment benefits, and inheritance laws define family as consisting of one
mother and one father.1
3 0
Working within the limited parameters of the societal structure, the
California Supreme Court in Johnson, for example, refused to recognize the
existence of two "natural" mothers.13 1 That court recognized that repro-
dubtive technology made such an outcome possible, but stated: "To recog-
nize parental rights in a third party... would diminish Crispina's [genetic
patent] role as [a] mother."'13  Arguably, such resistance to three-parent
the scope of this note). "If the embryo is viewed as possessing independent rights, the parties may
be unable to destroy it. If the embryo is viewed as not possessing rights separate from the parents,
then the embryo can be destroyed.' Luongo, supra note 73, at 1022.
126. See Dolgin, supra note 122, for a review of the transformation of the family from a bio-
genetic relationship to collection ofindividuals subject to rules in the marketplace.




130. See Mark Curriden, No Benefits for "Miracle'Baby, 81 A.B.A. J., Mar. 18, 1995, at 18.
Nancy Hart gave birth to Judith after being artificially inseminated with her husband's sperm.
Louisiana law defines "natural father" as one who is alive when his children are conceived. Due
to this, Judith is unable to receive $700 in survivor benefits. See ia
131. 851 P.2dat781.
132. Id. at n.8.
families is also due to society's uneasiness with drastic conceptual change
in its definition of a family.
33
The "best interests of the child" is a fundamental principle of family
law used in custody disputes. 34 Parenthood, under this principle, is predi-
cated on an ability to contribute to the child's emotional, mental and social
well-being. Factors that are pertinent to good parenting, and thus that are
in a child's best interests, include the ability to nurture the child physically
and psychologically and to provide ethical and intellectual guidance. Also
crucial to a child's best interest is the "well recognized right" of every child
to "stability and continuity."'
135
The "best interests of a child" principle also takes into account the
child's preference, as well as accounting for the interests and disposition of
the parents to the extent that they affect the child. 36 The undefined nature
of the standard permits acceptability of non-traditional family lifestyles as
long as the child is in a nurturing and caring environment.
137
In Ex Parte Devine,1 38 the Alabama Supreme Court enumerated factors
a trial court should consider in deciding "best interests" These factors in-
cluded the sex and age of the children,' 9 respective home environments, 40
effect on the child of disrupting existing custody arrangements, 141 recom-
mendations from experts or investigators, 42 and any other relevant evi-
dence.
1 43
Additionally, states follow statutory guidelines in applying the "best
interests" doctrine. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce ActT4 requires
133. See Barbara L. Shapiro, Non-Traditional Families in the Courts: The Nev Extended
Family, 11 J. AN. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 117-19 (1993) (asserting that multiple marriages, long-
term cohabitation relationships, changing social and economic role of women, and new reproduc-
tive technologies have caused departure from traditional notions of family which the courts have
been slow to address).
134. Robert Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child
at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker of Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L.
REv. 1 (1985).
135. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting), (citing In re Marriage of Carney, 598
P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979)); see Burchardv. Caray, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (Mosk, L, concurring).
136. See Natalie Young, Frozen Embryos: New Technology Meets Family Law, 21 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 559, 575-76 (1991), (citing In re Miller, 3 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1960)); Taber v.
Taber, 290 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1930).
137. See Myra G. Sencer, Adoption in the Non-Traditional Family--A Look at Some Alterna-
tives, 16 HOFSTRAL. REV. 191, 191-95 (1987).
138. 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981).
139. See id. at 696.
140. See id
141. See id, at 697.
142. See i,
143. See id.
144. UN F. MARRiGEA14DDivORCEACT § 402 (1973).
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courts to consider the wishes of the child,145 the wishes of the parents,
146
the child's interaction with his parents and/or siblings,147 the child's ad-
justment to his/her community,148 and the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved. 49 Further, the Act specifically forbids the court to
"consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relation-
ship to the child."'150
The "best interests of the child" doctrine provides the most flexible
approach in adjudicating custody disputes arising from unauthorized em-
bryo transfers. It requires the court to take a comprehensive approach by
considering all factors involved in ensuring the well-being of a child.
B. Best Interests of the Child Standard Provides the Solution
Courts should apply the best interests doctrine when deciding custody
disputes resulting from unauthorized embryo transfers like those in the
CRH case. Traditionally, modification or change of custody is not made
unless the custodial parent is shown as unfit. 51 Sexual orientation, 152
handicap, 153 and race,154 though not decisive, are factors which courts have
considered. 55 However, in the CRH case, where the genetic parents are
suing for change of custody, their change of custody petitions will not be
based upon allegations of parental unfitness. Rather, the petitions will be
based upon the right of genetic parents to raise children genetically related
to them. Here, courts face the crux of the issue presented by reproductive
technology: what constitutes legal parenthood?
The genetic tie is one more factor to consider in determining custody,
but it should not be the controlling factor. IVF technology exists because
of parents' need, in our society, to create genetic offspring.': 6 Indeed,
"[the] ability to tinker with the genes children inherit... exaggerates the








151. See Eeldman v. Feldman, 189 Misc. 564 (N.Y. 1947).
162. See M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 968-69 (N.Y. 1986). Homosexuality is not per
se factor of parental unfitness. See id
153. See In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36,42 (Cal. 1979). Handicap is not per se factor
of parental unfitness. See id.
154. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). Race cannot be used as a sole fac-
tor in depriving custody. See i d
155. See Cochran, supra note 134, at 14 (discussing the development of "best interests").
156. See Dorothy Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. C-. L. REV. 209,222 (1995).
157. Id. at 223.
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However, the genetic tie is not necessary to define personhood15s
Noted commentator Dorothy Roberts maintains, for instance, that "Black
Americans... developed a race consciousness rooted in a sense of people-
hood .... For them, ethnic identity is a conscious decision based primarily
on considerations other than biological heritage." 159 Using the genetic tie
as just one factor, "best interests" doctrine recognizes its value as an im-
portant bond, but also gives credence to relationships built upon cultural
preservation, love, and caring as well.
160
The best interests doctrine provides the most flexible approach to ad-
dress new conceptions of family. At the very least, it will provide an ur-
gently needed interim solution until legislators can promulgate laws that
more accurately reflect society's decision about how to address this new
potential for scientific abuse.
Family law has the built-in flexibility to adapt to changing times. Its
once popular "tender years" presumption, for example, has been aban-
doned, for the most part, as outdated. 61 Some courts have gone further and
ruled the tender years presumption unconstitutional. 16 2 In Garska v.
McCoy, 63 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals replaced the tender
years presumption with a more neutral presumption for primary caretaker
in recognition of the changing gender roles in society.
164
Thus, even though the best interests doctrine offers the most flexible
method of determining custody disputes regarding children conceived from
unauthorized embryo transfer, as society integrates new reproductive tech-
nologies into mainstream thought, it too may become outmoded or in need
of modification.
For now, however, the courts should use the best interests standard
with a presumption toward the gestational mother. The genetic parents
should only be given custody if they meet the high burden of proof set forth
158. Seeid.at231.
159. Ha at 233-34.
160. See ia at273.
161. In the mid-twentieth century, the maternal preference doctrine was a guiding principle in
inter-parent custody disputes. See Katherine Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong
Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1523, 1536
(1994). The courts focused on young children, of "tender years," who were thought to benefit
from placement with mother. See 14 See generally Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C.
1978); In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974); Commonwealth ex. rel Spriggs v.
Carson, 368 A.2d 635 (N.Y. 1977).
162. See Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (finding the "tender years" presumption
violates the equal protection clause.
163. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
164. Seeid. at361-63.
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in statutory requirements for change or modification of custody suits. 165
This burden guards against abrupt changes in custody, and this protects the
stability of a constant environment for the child. Furthermore, the extant
family's role is protected. 166 Such certainty and stability in an unregulated
field, which the presumption toward the gestational mother provides, off-
sets concerns that genetic ties may be overlooked. Parties entering IVF
transactions, aware of the presumption, will be more conscious of consent
forms and the placement of frozen embryos. The best interests standard,
though not perfect, provides the best solution because it attempts to address
and resolve conflicting interests.
V. Conclusion
Reproductive technology has achieved prominence and success at a
breathtaking, unregulated pace. At CRH, embryos were stolen, misappro-
priated, or transferred without authorized consent or knowledge. Regula-
tions concerning proper embryo transfers are scarce. Improper and unethi-
cal embryo transfers are difficult to regulate or criminalize because law has
not advanced at an equal pace with technology.
Science has thus again presented law with a question that existing
analysis cannot answer. Two couples, wanting desperately to conceive, go
for help to the same fertility clinic. Both couples engage in the time-
consuming, painful, and emotionally excruciating procedure. One couple
fights the odds and walks away with their miracle baby. The other couple
is not so lucky. A couple of years later, the horrifying truth is revealed.
The lucky couple finds out that they do not share a genetic bond with their
child. The genetic parents are now fighting for visitation rights, maybe
even custody. Who wins? Should we "consider parenthood to be a bundle
of rights, much as we have come to view property?"' 67 And if parenthood
is viewed as a bundle of rights, "should these rights be separated out and
split among several people?'
68
Courts should consider the genetic tie as one factor under family law's
best interests doctrine to resolve a custody dispute regarding a child con-
ceived through unauthorized embryo transfer. Given the inapplicability or
inadequacy of constitutional law, contract law, and property law to handle
165. Of course, in cases of intentional misappropriation, the gestational mother presumption
would not be so readily applied.
166. See Michael IL v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1988) (upholding statute establishing
presumption of legitimacy for child born to married woman living with her husband as promoting
an extant family's integrity and privacy).
167. FuRRow & JoHNsoN, supra note 23, at 111.
168. Id.
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such custody disputes, the best interests standard, in addition to the gesta-
tional mother presumption, will provide the best solution to such a difficult
and sensitive issue.

